T h e r e l a t i v e l y l o w adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC) rates in rural compared with urban counties is often cited as a primary reason for lower rates of Medicare risk-plan enrollment in rural areas of the United States. 1 The issue of volatility in AAPCC rates has received less attention, but it may be equally important. In a 1986 survey of Medicare health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 86 percent of the respondents contended that AAPCC payment levels within counties were unpredictable. 2 Susan Palsbo found that AAPCC rate volatility complicates longterm financial planning for Medicare HMOs. 3 Health plans serving counties with volatile rates face greater uncertainty regarding future payment rates and thus may be less willing to enter the market with a Medicare risk-contract product. 4 The current monthly payment per beneficiary for an HMO Medicare risk contract is set at 95 percent of the AAPCC rate in the county where the beneficiary lives, with adjustments made for a few selected enrollee characteristics. The AAPCC rates are computed by using five years of recent expenditure data in each county and comparing them to national average per capita spending. Therefore, AAPCC rates vary both across counties and over time. The main source of volatility in a county's AAPCC rate is fluctuations in service use patterns because the AAPCC rate is based on recent historical spending in the county for Medicare beneficiaries not enrolled in HMOs. Thus, the AAPCC rate is a function of utilization and price, both of which have been lower in rural counties, the latter because of recent Medicare reimbursement policies. 5 The problem of volatility may be exaggerated in rural areas because fluctuations in use patterns tend to be larger in areas with small Medicare populations. 6 The Clinton administration and several members of Congress have made proposals to alter AAPCC rate methodology to encourage equity in Medicare HMO capitation payments. These proposals address the problem of volatility in AAPCC rates by tying future increases in rates directly to national average growth in per capita spending, not expenditures in each county. The purpose of this DataWatch is to describe volatility in AAPCC payment rates within and between rural and urban areas over a seven-year period.
Data And Methods

Data.
The source for the data used here is a special county-level file compiled by the Rural Policy Research Institute (RUPRI) Rural Health Panel to study Medicare policy changes and their impacts on rural areas. Data on AAPCC rates for aged Medicare beneficiaries, total number of aged Medicare-eligible persons, and total enrollment in Medicare risk plans, all at the county level, were obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). These data were merged with a file containing county-level designations of urban/rural status, obtained from the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. The data from all of these sources were merged at the county level using the county identifiers supplied with each file (the FIPS [Federal Information Processing Standards] code and the Social Security Administration's code) and the county name where necessary. Data from Alaska were excluded from this analysis primarily because of incompatibilities between the HCFA and FIPS classifications. Data from U.S. territories (Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico) also were excluded.
Methods. The annual growth in AAPCC rates each year is used to measure the volatility of the rates over time. 7 Because AAPCC rates in a county are based on the projection of per capita spending by Medicare recipients not enrolled in Medicare HMOs in that year, the national average increases in medical spending for Medicare recipients represent an expected "trend" in the AAPCC rates in a given county. However, if the growth in AAPCC rates is greater or less than the national growth in Medicare spending, there will be changes in the local AAPCC rate. It is this volatility at the local level that is measured here.
To isolate the effect of volatility at the local level, the total annual growth in AAPCC rates at the county level was decomposed into three parts: (1) annual growth in inflation (the Consumer Price Index) at the national level, (2) annual growth in average Medicare spending at the national level (the U.S. per capita cost or USPCC) over and above general price inflation, and (3) all other factors accounting for growth (which we will call local volatility). Because one should reasonably expect rates at the local level to keep pace with inflation and with national Medicare spending, this method allows us to quantify the part of AAPCC volatility that is attributable to county-level variation in Medicare spending over time.
To illustrate this method, suppose a county has an AAPCC rate of $200 in 1990 and that the rate rises to $250 in 1991. Suppose also that the general inflation rate was 5 percent in 1991 and the USPCC grew 10 percent in 1991. The total growth in the AAPCC rate is 25 percent in 1991. Five percent of the growth is attributable to general inflation and an additional 5 percent to national Medicare per capita spending growth over and above general inflation, leaving 15 percent attributable to "local volatility."
In many counties AAPCC rates may not grow as fast as inflation and Medicare spending per capita combined. In these cases, the local volatility factor is negative. Since a Medicare risk plan may be concerned about uncertainty on either the positive or negative side-since positive volatility in one year might lead to negative volatility in the next year-measuring growth in AAPCC rates does not capture all of the volatility of interest. We computed averages of the absolute value of growth to address this problem.
Assessing The Rates
While the average change in AAPCC rates ranged from 1.8 percent in 1991 to 13.4 percent in 1993, these arithmetic averages hide the degree of change in AAPCC rates in specific counties (Exhibit 1). Indeed, in any given year the increase or decrease in AAPCC rates in specific counties was quite large. For example, in 1997, in one county the AAPCC rate decreased 40.2 percent; in another the rate increased 37 percent. In the 1990-1997 period, the maximum decrease observed was 42.7 percent and the maximum increase, 84.7 percent (data not shown).
Change over time. These simple measures of volatility do not adequately summarize the volatility in AAPCC rates over time. De-composing volatility into its sources indicates that the average growth in AAPCC rates was 7.04 percent over the 1990-1997 period (Exhibit 2). The average of the absolute values of annual change shows an average volatility of plus or minus 7.61 percent over the same period. This volatility should elicit some concern among health plans interested in enrolling Medicare beneficiaries.
Sources of volatility. Our results indicate that an average of 3.42 percent of the volatility is the result of general inflation in the economy and 3.5 percent is attributable to growth in national average Medicare spending per capita (USPCC) over and above general in- in rural adjacent counties (3.3 percent) and rural nonadjacent counties (4.05 percent) than it was in urban counties (2.59 percent). These results support the notion that AAPCC rates will be more volatile in rural areas because of their smaller populations. Among smaller populations, a few high-cost procedures or patients could have a large influence on the AAPCC rate in any given year. Thus, it is not surprising that volatility is higher in counties with fewer than 500 Medicare eligibles (volatility of 7.26 percent) than in more populated counties, especially those with 100,000 or more Medicare beneficiaries (2.1 percent). Volatility also seems to be related to the risk-plan penetration rate (enrollees in Medicare risk plans as a ratio to total Medicare beneficiaries) in the county; it is higher in counties with no risk enrollment (4.36 percent) than it is in counties with considerable risk enrollment (2.43 percent). Finally, volatility is highest in counties with the lowest AAPCC rates in 1997. Distribution of counties. Seven percent of counties (n = 218) experienced average local volatility of 6 percent or more over the 1990-1997 period, and 27.4 percent (n = 853) experienced local volatility that averaged 4 percent or more over this period (Exhibit 3). Rural counties experienced greater volatility than urban counties, with 12.9 percent of rural nonadjacent counties and 4 percent of rural adjacent counties experiencing volatility of 6 percent or more. In comparison, only 1.3 percent of urban counties experienced this much volatility. Again, major changes in utilization by a few persons will have less effect on the average costs in a more populous county.
H E A L T H A F F A I R S~V
Specific counties. The counties with the greatest volatility are two counties with very small populations of Medicare beneficiaries-Loving and King Counties in Texas (Exhibit 4). However, even counties with larger populations-such as Delta County in Colorado-had significant volatility. Volatility is greater in counties with low AAPCC rates and counties with few Medicare eligibles.
Implications For Policy
Proposals being considered at the federal level would virtually eliminate the problem of volatility in risk-plan capitation rates. All of the proposals would reduce variation in rates by setting the adjusted capitation rate equal to a blended capitation rate (the weighted average of the capitation rates in the area and a price-adjusted national average rate), with rates set at least as high as a "floor" (typically a percentage of the price-adjusted national average capitation rate or a dollar amount) or a "hold-harmless" rate (typically a percentage of the area's adjusted capitation rate in the previous year). 8 A less-noticed effect of these provisions (common to all proposals) is that rates in the future will increase at a steady and predictable rate, thus remov-ing the year-to-year volatility described here. In 1998 and all years thereafter all rates used in the formula will be increased by basically the average national increase in per capita Medicare spending. Volatility in rates will be virtually eliminated after the year 2002, after all of the provisions of the legislation are phased in.
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Effect on Medicare risk plans. If enacted, these policies to eliminate volatility at the local level, and to reduce variation in AAPCC rates across counties, would introduce more predictability and stability into the Medicare risk-plan program and increase its effectiveness as a means of Medicare reform. A combination of smoothing out volatility and increasing the lowest AAPCC rates would increase the likelihood that managed care plans would offer risk plans in rural counties. Rural health care providers, to the extent that they participate in managed care plans and receive favorable payment from those plans, would also benefit from correcting existing problems in the AAPCC calculations.
However, enacting a policy to reduce variation and volatility is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for increased managed care penetration. Other factors that contribute to the environment for Medicare managed care penetration include the number of Medicare beneficiaries in a market; non-Medicare enrollment in HMOs; the history of managed care activities in an area; demand for managed care by retirees accustomed to HMO enrollment; and entry of a new competitor into a local market. more completely the factors affecting Medicare risk-plan penetration. Raising capitation rates in areas with historically low rates and reducing the volatility in these rates might not remove enough of the risk in an area to encourage a managed care organization to offer a risk plan there. This is especially true if the current proposals do not overcome the underlying problem that AAPCC volatility reflects in rural areas. The data presented here provide a cautionary tale, because they show that what underlies AAPCC volatility-the volatility in county fee-for-service expenditures-should not be ignored, even if there is a departure from the current AAPCC methodology.
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Other policy alternatives may be available to help alleviate the problems of variation and volatility in risk-plan capitation rates. For example, current legislative proposals include provisions that allow state executives to request the secretary of health and human services to adjust the system under which Medicare payment areas are determined in a state. This would allow for the grouping or consolidation of counties in a state, with all counties outside of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) grouped into a single Medicare payment area for the purposes of calculating Medicare capitation rates. It is likely for statistical reasons that this option would reduce variation and volatility in capitation rates, but the effects of the procedure would depend, of course, on the decisions made for grouping counties. Our sensitivity analysis of this option suggests that it is a viable alternative for reducing volatility in capitation rates. Grouping rural adjacent and rural nonadjacent counties in each of five states reduced volatility by at least 4.5 percent and by as much as 18 percent. Grouping counties would also encourage HMOs to consider broader areas as potential markets, aggregating Medicare beneficiaries to a minimum needed to offer risk plans.
